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11.  Introduction
 Generic, radical technology is of interest because of its potential for value creation across a
broad range of industries and applications.  By ‘generic technology’ we refer to “a
technology the exploitation of which will yield benefits for a wide range of sectors of the
economy and/or society” (Keenan 2003).  We further define “radical technology” as having
“the potential for delivering dramatically better product performance or lower production
costs, or both” (Utterback, 1996, p. 158).  Thus defined, the commercialization of generic,
radical technology is highly desirable both to national governments and to firms seeking
profit.  Nevertheless, there are instances where generic, radical technology faces very high
barriers to commercialization despite its potential for value creation.
Information technology is a well studied example of a generic technology that has
created new value for a broad range of industries throughout the economy.  Radical
developments in advanced materials technology are now viewed as an enabler for further
innovations with the potential for major economic impact across a broad range of industries
and applications (Massachusetts Technology Collaborative, 2004; Oliver, 1999; OECD,
1998). Advanced materials are attracting both government interest and new entrants.
However, the upstream position in the value chain accessible to most entrants, and the costs,
time and uncertainty associated with commercializing radical advanced materials technology
have implications that have not been widely recognized in policy discussions.  This paper sets
out to explain the challenges to commercialization faced by advanced materials ventures and
the ways in which these challenges can be addressed.
We build on Freeman’s (1982) concept of technological innovation as a technology
and market matching process to develop a model of the variables influencing value creation
by advanced materials ventures.  We show how the generic and radical nature of the
technologies of advanced materials ventures, combined with their upstream position in one or
2several industry value chains and the need for industry specific and application specific
complementary innovations, leads to high sustained levels of technology and market
uncertainty.  We further show how these high levels of uncertainty impact their ability to
create value.
Radical advanced materials technologies are here defined as product and process
improvements that significantly enhance the cost-performance frontier of functional
materials.  This type of technology has the potential to lead to radical innovations
downstream in several industry value chains (Klevorik et al, 1995).  Examples of radical
advanced materials innovations include the use of nanomaterials to alter the mechanical,
electrical, and/or thermal properties of components of products in a broad range of industries,
organic light emitting polymers used to create diodes for flat panel displays and other
consumer electronic applications, and Kevlar fibre used as a light-weight reinforcement in
aerospace, sports equipment, automotive, military, and marine applications.
The structure of this paper is as follows.  First, we provide a review of the technology
innovation literature.  Next we draw on this literature, along with other literatures relevant to
advanced materials innovation, in developing a model of the variables influencing value
creation by advanced materials ventures. We then provide an exposition of the model with
evidence from a sample of ten US advanced materials ventures, and, in particular, from an in-
depth case study of the most established venture in our sample.   From the literature, our
model and our case study observations, we construct four propositions predicting venture
success in commercializing radical advanced materials technology.  Lastly, we put forward
managerial and policy recommendations meant to assist advanced materials ventures in
creating and capturing value.
31.1  Literature Review
There is an extensive management literature on technological innovation, but no known
studies that explicitly address the issue with which we are concerned: the commercialization
of generic technology that is radical in nature and initiated from an upstream position in
several industry value chains.  In this section, we review relevant management literature on
technological innovation, distinguishing between generic technology, radical technology,
revolutionary innovation, disruptive innovation, product versus process innovation, and
upstream versus downstream innovation, as shown in Table 1.  In section 2, we review the
existing literature on innovation in the advanced materials sector, and integrate it with the
literatures on technology-market coupling, adoption of innovation and dynamic capabilities.
A generic technology1 has a wide breadth of applications across industry sectors
(Keenan, 2003; Martin, 1993; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1991).    Examples of generic
technologies include steam power, telecommunications and Information Technology
(Rosenberg and Trajtenberg, 2001; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).  Scott Shane (2004)
proposes five benefits to new ventures who exploit such technologies: first, they allow the
flexibility to pursue alternative market applications should the first attempt prove unviable;
second, they allow ventures to diversify risks and amortize R&D costs across separate
applications; third, the markets with potential are at various stages of maturity, and thus
provide short-term, medium-term and long-term revenue opportunities; fourth, target market
applications in different sectors can be compared; fifth, the breadth and scope of opportunity
attracts investment. Shane argues further that new ventures benefit from the very features of
generic technologies which hinder commercialization efforts by established firms (Shane,
2004, pp. 123-124).  In section 2, we show how, for advanced materials ventures, these
benefits are counterbalanced by difficulties created by the generic, radical and upstream
                                                 
1 A closely related term, General Purpose Technology, also refers to technology that impacts
a broad range of industries
4nature of advanced materials technology.
Where the term generic technology signifies breadth, radical technology signifies
depth.  That is to say, a radical technology has significant value potential in an individual
application.  Foster (1986) depicted a radical innovation as achieving a higher performance
level than the incumbent technology along S-curves of performance attributes over time.
Thus, Foster argued, equivalent efforts on improving the incumbent technology and the
radical technology would result in relative advantage for the firm utilizing the radical
technology. (Foster, 1986, pp. 101-102, 123-125).  When radical technology enables new
performance attributes that may lead to entirely new applications, it generally cannot be
commercialized through a standard “market pull” strategy: customers may have latent
requirements they cannot articulate or even know before an invention occurs (Freeman, 1982,
pp. 109-110).  Thus radical technologies are either commercialized through “technology
push” (e.g. the laser and the personal computer) or through a technology-market matching or
coupling process (Freeman, 1982, pp. 109-110; Rothwell, 1992).  Additionally, several
authors argue that small firms are better at commercializing radical innovations than large
firms (Rothwell, 1984; Utterback, 1996; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Shane, 2005).
Abernathy and Clark (1985) defined revolutionary innovation as a product or process
change that overturns a firm’s technical and/or production competencies. Their concept of
revolutionary innovation is relative to a firm’s resource base and history, rather than
describing a technology in absolute terms.   Tushman and Anderson (1986) broadened this
concept of revolutionary innovation to include a firm’s knowledge, skills, routines and
relationships.  They  describe the impact of a discontinuous technology on incumbent firms
as either competence-enhancing or competence destroying.  Competence-enhancing
discontinuities are normally initiated by incumbent firms, which use their existing
competences to master the new technologies, maintaining their competitive advantage over
5potential new entrants.  The structure of the industry remains stable as few new firms, if any,
enter.  Leadership consolidates and barriers to entry, such as minimum scale requirements,
are introduced during a relatively short era of experiment. Competence-destroying
discontinuities, on the contrary, are normally initiated by new firms, lowering barriers to
entry.  The pioneers with discontinuous technologies are often new start-ups that do not
suffer from the inertia preventing incumbent firms from seeing the need for and developing
the required competences. ‘Incumbent inertia’ describes the resistance of an organisation to
change, and results from organisational culture (values, beliefs, attitudes), structure,
defensive response from leadership, traditions, sunk costs, and current customer’s satisfaction
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988, pp.41-58).   Christensen’s (1997) concept of ‘disruptive
technology’ describes such competence-destroying discontinuities, and the inertia that
prevents incumbents from recognizing the potential of an emerging market and/or product
feature.
Another distinction made in the field of technology innovation is that between
innovation in products and innovation in production processes.  Utterback (1996) has shown
that, as an industry matures, experimentation in production processes result in what is known
as an enabling technology.  For a process innovation the enabling technology (e.g. float glass
production) is equivalent to a dominant design in a product (e.g. internal combustion engine)
in that both a dominant product design and an enabling process innovation become the
industry standard.  The enabling technology “incorporates many of the elements needed in a
continuous production process and allows the focus of technological effort to shift to process
improvements from product innovation and design (Utterback 1996 p.125)."
An industry value chain is a depiction of the primary and supporting activities
performed by a firm or by a group of firms to convert raw materials and information into
products and services of value (Porter, 1985).  When firms are described as occupying an
6upstream or downstream position on an industry value chain, this refers to the distance from
the activity performed to the consumer, with downstream being closer to the consumer.  Thus
upstream innovation refers to innovation initiated at the furthest extreme of an industry value
chain from the consumer. Firms are more likely to initiate innovation from an upstream
position as the applicability of the technology to various industries increases (Arora et al,
2001, pp. 146-149).  In other words, generic technologies are more likely to be introduced by
upstream specialized technology firms, supplying downstream customers in several
industries.  However, the ease of entrance of new ventures is technology sector specific
(Pavitt, 1984), with initial economies of scale being more important in sectors such as
advanced materials.  Thus, generic technologies may be, in theory, easier for new upstream
entrants to commercialize than established incumbents; but, in practice, this may be very
difficult to achieve in some sectors.  In sections 2.1 and 2.2, we discuss the impact of
upstream innovation on the ability of advanced materials ventures to commercialize radical,
generic technology.
An innovation creates value for consumers when the products it enables outperform
existing substitutes, match substitute performance at lower cost, or meet consumer needs for
which there is no existing substitute.  Value capture measures the extent to which the
orginators of an innovation are able to appropriate this newly created value (Teece, 1986).  In
Table 2, we summarize the influence of the radical and generic nature of a new technology,
an upstream value chain position, and the presence of market incumbents on a new entrant’s
ability to create and capture value.  These influences are categorized as technology, market,
or technology and market matching factors, in accordance with Freeman’s (1982) concept of
innovation as a process of technology and market matching.  In the next section, we develop
a model that depicts the influence of these factors on the likelihood of value creation by
ventures commercializing a specific set of generic, radical technologies, that of advanced
7materials.  We begin by reviewing the sparse literature on the commercialization of advanced
materials technology.
2.  Technological and Market Challenges of Innovation in Advanced Materials
Freeman set out the challenge of matching technological capabilities to market opportunities
in the innovation process:
“Innovation is essentially a two-sided or coupling activity.  It has been compared by
Schmookler to the blades of a pair of scissors […].  On the one hand, it involves the
recognition of a need or more precisely, in economic terms, a potential market for a
new product or process.  On the other hand, it involves technical knowledge, which
may be generally available, but may also often include new scientific and
technological information, the result of original research activity.  Experimental
development and design, trial production and marketing involve a process of
‘matching’ the technical possibilities and the market.  (Freeman, 1982, p.109)
Although aspects of this matching process are common to emerging technology
industries, firms in the advanced materials sector face a unique combination of
sustained high technological and high market risk because of their upstream position
in the value chains of their target markets and because of the difficulty of
appropriating much of the value generated by generic radical technology.  We
illustrate these cicumstances in Figure 1, where the challenges of innovation in the
advanced materials sector are represented by the technology and market scissor blades
respectively, “matching” is represented by the axis where the blades are attached and
aligned, and value creation is represented by the cutting edge.  Schmookler’s (1966)
analogy is particularly apt in that solutions to technological and marketing challenges
must be synchronised if successful co-evolution is to occur.  This synchronisation or
matching process is particularly complex for new entrants in the advanced materials
sector as it involves high cost product and process development, complementary
innovation, vertical integration or alliance formation, long time horizons, financial
investment, and tolerance of sustained technology and market uncertainty.  In the
8remainder of this section, we systematically discuss each of the technology and
market challenges facing advanced materials ventures in terms of the distinctive
features of the advanced materials sector.
In the case of advanced materials ventures, the factors identified in Table 2
are revealed to influence one another, and, ultimately, value creation and capture, in a
complex, non-linear fashion.  Qualitative relationships of a systemic nature that
together influence an  outcome can be depicted in an influence flow  diagram,  in
which a positive influence by one factor on another is marked by a ‘plus’ arrow, the
negative influence of one factor on another by a ‘minus’ arrow.  The interactive
nature of the causal relationships is shown in feedback links which result in a variable
operating both as cause and effect (Wolstenholme, 1990).  Specifying further from
research and observation the factors outlined in Table 2, we identify key variables
and their influence on advanced materials ventures’ propensity to create value
(Figure 2).  We choose to focus on value creation as our dependent variable, as it is a
necessary condition for value capture, and gives the model greater testability.
Technological uncertainty and market uncertainty are critical intervening variables
impacting on value creation, mediated by the venture’s capacity to demonstrate the
value of its innovation in a specific application, by the availability of finance and by
access to complementary assets.  The model variables influencing technological
uncertainty are described in section 2.1, those influencing market uncertainty are
described in section 2.2, and the mediating variables influencing value creation are
described in section 2.3.
2.1  Technology Challenges
Significant technological challenges, extending over long periods of time, often lead to
sustained high levels of technological uncertainty during the attempted commercialization of
9radical advanced materials technology. This technological uncertainty is directly impacted by
the radical nature of the technology under consideration, the need for process innovations,
and the multiple markets to which the technology may be applied.  These technological
challenges are depicted in the top left section of Figure 2, and discussed below.
Radical advanced materials innovation involves commercializing new knowledge
generated by basic and applied research, generally taking place in universities, government
laboratories, and the R&D laboratories of large firms (Baba et al., 2005; Eager, 1998; Niosi,
1993; Williams, 1993, p. 23).  The novelty of the technology leads to a high level of
technological uncertainty regarding the possibility of replicating laboratory attributes in
product prototypes and in viable production processes.  Thus, in addition to basic research
and invention, commercialization of a radical materials innovation requires expensive process
innovation, prototype development and pilot plant development (Maine et al., 2005;
Hounshell, 1988, pp. 262-268, 431-432; Williams, 1993, p. 43-44), which greatly exceed the
mandate and budgets of research universities and laboratories.  Additionally, the radical
nature of the technology may initially require a “technology push” commercialization
strategy, as undertaken with Kevlar fiber, metal matrix composites, and carbon reinforced
polymers, because many consumers in their vast potential markets do not perceive utility ex
ante.
The need for process innovation results from by two factors.  The first is the upstream
position of advanced materials in the value chains of each of the industries in which it is
commercialized (Klevorick et al., 1994).  This upstream position means that the creation of a
prototype product, for any industry, requires more than just the venture’s intermediate
product.2  It will depend on downstream design and process innovations, and may depend on
                                                 
2 New advanced materials do not fall neatly into either of the standard categories of
product or process innovation, discussed in section 1.1.  Rather than representing a
breakthrough in a single production process, new materials support and require many layers
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complementary innovations.  Customers value product performance attributes at a specific
price, in other words, they have a utility for each performance attribute (Maine and Ashby,
2002).  Even if a novel performance attribute or package of attributes is agreed to be useful, it
will only demonstrate value in a specific applications if customers’ utility for that attribute or
package of attributes is sufficiently high (Maine and Ashby, 2002).
The second factor impacting the need for process innovation is the presence of
incumbents with established products.  When there are established substitute products, the
valuation of attributes is generally linked to that of the incumbent product, which may be
produced in large volumes.  To displace the substitute product, process innovations are
required to make a new material viable (Maine and Ashby, 2002) by producing in larger
volumes and for lower cost.  For example, when DuPont was attempting to commercialize
Kevlar fibre, they defined their technical process goals as producing fibre with certain
mechanical attributes (stiffness, strength, toughness, etc) at a cost that enabled them to price
their material at 4x the price of the steel belts with which they were competing.  That
converted into a selling price of approximately $2.40 /lb (Christensen, 1998).  However,
DuPont was never able to produce Kevlar fibre for anything close to this cost, highlighting
the amount of technological uncertainty involved in their process innovations.
As radical advanced materials technology has broad potential applications across multiple
markets (OECD, 1998, p. 40; Williams, 1993, p.7; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1991), R&D
is needed for each targeted market application and process innovations in each of these
markets are also necessary for economies of scale, generally before a return on investment is
achieved (Maine and Garnsey, 2004; Hounshell, 1988, p. 432).  The need for market-specific
R&D results from the differing values placed on application attributes in different markets
                                                                                                                                                        
of product and process innovations right along the value chain.  A single advanced material
technology can be a product, a production process, an enabling technology, and the enabler of
many downstream products.
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(Maine & Ashby, 2005; Mangin et al., 1995) and from diverse regulatory requirements in
different sectors.  In emerging markets, advanced materials innovators are faced with
investing in the most expensive stage of R&D before gaining feedback from the consumer.
Resolving this technological uncertainty typically requires a high level of investment
over long periods of time, because of the customized R&D, pilot plants, and process
innovation for specific market applications that are required.  This also applies to incumbent
firms.  When developing and commercializing Kevlar fibre, DuPont spent $5.7 million on lab
research, $32 million on pilot plant development, over $300 million on commercial plant
construction and approximately another $150 million on marketing, sales and distribution.
(Christensen, 1998; Hounshell and Smith, 1988, pp. 431-432).  Thus, in order to demonstrate
value in a specific application, an advanced materials venture needs access to long term
financing.  Certainly to commercialize their technology, external financing is required for
advanced materials ventures following an in-house manufacturing strategy.
2.2 Market Challenges
The marketing challenges faced by advanced materials ventures are also formidable, leading
to sustained market uncertainty, and difficulty in demonstrating value in a specific
application.  The high level of market uncertainty inherent in the commercialization of
advanced materials technology is directly impacted by the upstream position of advanced
materials ventures in the value chains of the industries they target, the need for
complementary innovations, the lack of continuity, observability and trialability of the
technology, and the multiple markets to which they may be applied.  These factors are
depicted in the lower half of Figure 2, and discussed below.  
Most firms commercializing advanced materials technology produce an intermediate
good (Williams, 1993, pp. 17-18).  Thus, they do not deal directly with consumers in the
broad applications to which their innovation may be applied, (including aerospace,
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automotive, consumer electronics, construction, power generation, communication
infrastructure, sports equipment, marine applications and biomedical devices).  This makes it
difficult for them to assess consumer needs, and to manage market experimentation and
feedback.  Their customers are component suppliers and assembled goods original equipment
manufacturers (OEMS) who must be convinced to design products incorporating their
innovation.  The designers in these manufacturing firms may not be familiar with a new
material class and its design possibilities: even if they are aware of the material, they may
resist the introduction of a new material because it requires extra learning and effort on their
part.  When potential customers do agree to adopt the technology, the new material will not
be introduced into the current product, and so waits on the product cycle (approximately three
years for automotive applications and up to 30 years for aerospace applications).
Moreover, advanced materials innovations are not autonomous: they rely on related
complementary innovations in order to be brought to market as a product. There are
numerous historical examples of the need for complementary innovations in advanced
materials.  Glass fibre innovations needed to wait on complementary innovations in laser
technology before fibre optics applications were enabled.  Kevlar fibre didn’t achieve
significant adoption until changes in body armour design (in recognition of new functional
possibilities) and the new requirements of fibre optic infrastructure eventually resulted in
viable market niches for the new material.  Similarly, the significant adoption of carbon fibre
was dependent on process innovations in polymer composite manufacturing and required
significant design changes in eventual aerospace, marine, sporting goods, and race car
applications.  Today, proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cells, targeted at replacing the
internal combustion engine in automobiles, are waiting on process innovations to reduce the
cost of (or need for) polymer membranes, catalysts and fuel cell stacks, on infrastructure
standards to be established, and on legislation reflecting the costs to society of pollution.  The
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need for these complementary innovations increase market uncertainty for the advanced
materials technology and delay a firm’s ability to demonstrate the value of an advanced
materials technology in specific applications.
Lack of continuity leads to greater market uncertainty and delays in adoption of an
innovation (Rogers, 1995).  For example, an advanced materials innovation may enable a
new reduced cost substitute to an existing material (aluminium beer cans in place of steel
cans).  Generally this requires some shift in the design of the product and the manufacturing
process (Maine and Ashby, 2002),3 and thus overturns technology and production
competencies of OEM manufacturers.  In this case, the OEM customer faces the challenges
inherent in revolutionary innovation (Abernathy and Clark, 1985).  A new material may also
bring completely new functionality: the transistor was made possible by materials process
innovations that included developing a process for producing high purity germanium and
silicon, and growing first germanium and then silicon as a single crystal (O’Riorden and
Hoddeson, 1997, p. 102,172-174, 178-180, 198-199, 207-209, 230).  In this case of new
functionality, OEM customers are facing both the overturning of production/technology
competencies and the overturning of market linkages:  Abernathy and Clark (1985) refer to
this type of organizational challenge as architectural innovation.  Achieving the potential of
the new material may also require changes that undermine the dominant product design
(Utterback, 1994). As examples, the use of new alloys and composites required changes in
the design of aircraft.  Likewise, substantial structural use of polymer composites would
require the redesign of the automobile.
                                                 
3 Substitutions into existing applications present challenging, albeit known, production cost
targets.  Small volume applications, which are of less interest to VCs and to large companies,
will more often support price differentiation and allow for lower upfront capital investment
due to a higher ratio of variable to fixed costs.  Large volume applications require a greater
initial capital investment to contest the incumbent material which has had the opportunity to
exploit production learning curves and economies of scale.
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Thus, radical innovation such as that enabled by advanced materials technology
makes significant demands on customers and sometimes consumers.  Adoption of radical
innovations requires recognition of the relative advantage they offer; however, because they
are discontinuous with existing offerings, the change in outlook required for recognition is
notoriously difficult to elicit. Research on adopter resistance has shown that innovations that
are compatible with existing practices and offer benefits which can be understood, observed
and tried out without incurring switching costs are more likely to diffuse rapidly. Conversely,
innovations that lack these attributes face adoption delays (Rogers 1995; Moore 1991).
Observing or trialing an advanced materials technology generally requires a full working
prototype of the downstream product, and even then consumers may have difficulty
observing the advanced materials technology itself.  Thus, market uncertainty is also
increased by the absence of continuity, observability and trialability represented by most
advanced materials technologies.
Finally, since advanced materials ventures may target several industries, they must
gather information on customer utility for performance attributes for applications in several
industries.  Targeting multiple markets also exposes a firm to industry specific changes in
regulations, consumer attitudes, designer familiarity, and infrastructure.  These factors
increase overall market uncertainty and may combine to delay the significant adoption of
advanced materials between 15 and 40 years.  As examples, Polypropylene took 37 years,
Teflon (PTFE) took 31 years, Kevlar took 17 years, and carbon fibre took 34 years to reach
50 percent of their peak annual sales volume (Figure 3).  In each case, annual production
volumes increased as more designers became familiar with the new material, as market
applications in new industries were recognized or emerged, and as complementary
innovations occurred.  These long time frames negatively influence investors and the
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willingness of potential alliance partners to invest time and money in prototype development
for their industry.
2.3  Matching Process
It is a dilemma of commercializing advanced materials technology that there is
massive potential for value creation in many applications, but this very multiplicity of
possibilities creates targeting and market experimentation problems.  For each target
market, research and development specific to various industry applications must be
performed, diverse regulatory hurdles must be surmounted, prototypes must be
developed, customer reluctance to change specifications for an established product
must be overcome, process innovation must occur and complementary innovations
may be required (Maine and Garnsey, 2004; Williams, 1993, p.35).  As we depict in
Figure 2, external financing and access to complementary assets through alliances
significantly increase the likelihood of value creation, conditional on value being
demonstrated in a specific application.  Recognition and prioritization of such
potential applications is a key managerial capability for firms commercializing radical
advanced materials technology.
Firms can recognize opportunities for a new market application for an existing
advanced materials technology (through substitution) when the management team has
varied industry experience or when advice is sought from a technology brokering firm
(Hargadon, 2002).   Firms can achieve superior performance through such a strategy
if they have the combination of strong intellectual property generation and protection,
strong recognition and exploitation capabilities, and the ability to access and mobilize
complementary assets (Teece, 1986; Teece et al, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
New ventures generally access these complementary assets through alliance partners
in each target market (Niosi, 1993).  Ventures can prioritize market applications
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through modelling the viability and attractiveness of each application for substitution
applications (Maine et al, 2005). However, when advanced materials inventions
overturn current technological knowledge and also enable entirely new markets, both
modelling and less formal recognition capabilities are often unreliable.
For co-evolving technologies and markets, a strategy of market
experimentation has been recommended by industry experts rather than an early
exclusive focus on any one particular market or product design (Leonard, 1995;
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).4  This strategy is expensive within any single industry,
and more so for advanced materials firms, as emerging applications for advanced
materials technology extend over several unrelated industries, each one of which
require costly and uncertain efforts at finding and developing a successful initial
market application.  This cost, uncertainty, and the timeframe involved in the
commercialization of a new advanced material often leads to severe investment
constraints despite their potential for value creation, undermining the benefits credited
to generic technology by Shane (2004).  Thus, access to finance is critical for an
advanced materials venture, both to demonstrate value in specific applications and to
be in a good position to create and capture value.  To successfully match a new
ventures technology with a market application, and thus to demonstrate value in
specific applications, an advanced materials venture needs both financing and access
to complementary assets (Figure 2).
3.  Firm Level Evidence
3.1 Sample of Advanced Materials Ventures
                                                 
4 Though there is debate as to whether dynamic capabilities are firm specific (Teece et al
1997) or replicable (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000), the importance of these capabilities for a
firm’s competitive advantage are not in question.
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The challenges of commercializing generic, radical technology from an upstream
position in several industry value chains are evident when such ventures are examined at the
firm level.  We studied the identifiable advanced materials ventures in the region of Boston,
MA, USA, and summarize our observations in Table 3.  We chose the greater Boston area
because it has a substantial concentration of advanced materials ventures by world standards.
These ventures were interviewed from 2002 to 2003 and were all still in existence in 2005.
Six of the ten ventures were less than five years old at the time of the interviews: half of those
new ventures had previously been incubated within another, larger firm.  The experiences of
this sample of advanced materials ventures highlight the challenges of commercialization of
generic radical upstream technology and the methods employed to alleviate financial
constraints.
  All ten of the firms had prospects for creating substantial value, with large target
markets often spanning multiple industries.  Table 3 outlines the current and future target
markets of the sample firms: seven of these firms identified four or more distinct target
market verticals.   Eight of these firms are currently following a manufacturing business
model, albeit often also incorporating licensing, contract research, and manufacturing with
outsourcing.  This demonstrates both their potential for value creation and the importance of
their technology market matching process.
However, commercialising advanced materials technology which alters the cost-
performance frontier of downstream products involves high capital costs over significant
timeframes. Only three of the 10 firms did not identify lack of finance as the primary barrier
to growth for their firm (Table 3).  Of those three firms, one employed a licensing model
only, one had already achieved substantial VC financing, and the last was spun out of a larger
firm after establishing an ongoing revenue stream from product sales.  Six of the ten firms
indicated that SBIR grants were critical to their survival and growth.  These are substantial
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US government agency grants, awarded through competition, which fund prototype
development.  Of the four firms which did not receive SBIR grants, two were among those
which were spun out of a larger firm, one had other government funding, and the last had
ongoing strong ties with a prestigious research university.  Lastly, seven of the ten sample
firms had created effective strategic alliances which reduced their barriers to entry by
providing them access to complementary assets for product commercialization.  Thus SBIR
grants and strategic alliances were used by these sample firms to alleviate financial
constraints when developing prototypes for their generic, radical, upstream technology.
We turn now to the oldest and most successful of the ten companies in our sample,
and give a more detailed case study examination of their technological development and
technology market matching experiences.  We chose Hyperion as our case study exemplar
because they have been through their initial development of their advanced materials
technology, and have successfully commercialized over 40 products in three distinct industry
value chains.  They have also experienced several of the difficulties we have outlined thus
far.  We demonstrate those challenges in section 3.3, where we apply the analysis set out in
Figure 2 to Hyperion.
3.2 Case History of Hyperion Catalysis5
Hyperion Catalysis was formed in 1981 with funding from a Silicon Valley venture capitalist
who judged that the advanced materials sector offered outstanding long term value potential.
He brought together a scientific advisory board to help him pick an appropriate focus within
the advanced materials sector.  This board, consisting mainly of scientists from MIT and
Harvard, advised on carbon microfilaments, subject to resolving technical uncertainty about
                                                 
5 This case study was compiled from primary and secondary sources, including interviews
with Hyperion Marketing Director Pat Collins on Oct. 31, 2003, and Aug. 19, 2005, articles
by Small Times, The Economist, New Scientist, Automotive News, Chemical Market
Reporter, and European Venture Capital Journal, and the US patent database at uspto.gov.
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synthesis.  One employee, a retiring industrial chemist, was hired to start conducting research
on this area.  With some encouraging results, Hyperion incorporated in 1982, locating in
Cambridge, MA because of the existing location of their key employee and most of the
scientific board. Their goal was to develop a radical innovation in advanced materials
technology: if successful, the potential for long term value creation was enormous, as such an
innovation could improve products across most industrial sectors.
From 1982 – 1989, Hyperion focused on developing the first viable multiwalled carbon
nanotube product & process, with patient capital provided by their founder and owner.  Their
key breakthrough was their 1983 synthesis of multiwalled carbon nanotubes, which Hyperion
protected by filing for a patent in 1984.  This patent, which issued in 1987, is the first US
carbon nanotube patent6 and became key to Hyperion’s patent portfolio (US Pat No.
4,663,230).  From 1984 to 1989, Hyperion’s scientific team developed their technology from
a laboratory process to a production process with numerous patents filed on improvements in
the reactor design and the development of a continuous manufacturing process.  The output
of this vapour deposition process is their key intermediate product, multiwalled (MW) carbon
nanotubes, later trademarked FIBRIL.TM
By 1989, Hyperion had achieved their technical objectives which included learning
how to make these MW carbon nanotubes in large scale production volumes and with high
purity.   Next they began focusing on commercialization.  Although they were certain of their
intention to follow an in-house manufacturing business model, they struggled to choose
between the many potential uses for their advanced materials product and process inventions,
including potential uses in the automotive, aerospace, and power generation industries.
Hyperion did not yet have prototypes suitable to demonstrate feasibility to these
                                                 
6 Carbon nanotubes have generated considerable interest as they enable radical improvement
in the performance attributes of composite materials as well as enabling entirely new
products.
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marketplaces.  Hence, they publicized their technical achievements widely, in the hopes of
attracting potential customers and/or alliance partners.  This strategy proved successful, as
Hyperion was approached by their first alliance partner as a result of these efforts.
This first alliance partner, a European-owned resin supplier, thought that Hyperion’s
technology would solve their own problem with an automotive application.  The resin
supplier had been attempting to displace steel fuel lines, and had established a solid
production cost advantage, but needed to make their polymeric fuel lines conductive for
safety reasons.  The resin supplier had already identified the resin, Nylon 12, and was
confident that Hyperion’s MW carbon nanotubes could be compounded with that resin to
make conductive composite automotive fuel lines.  The resin supplier’s compounding and
manufacturing equipment, along with their contacts into the automotive industry were key to
Hyperion successfully selling product into the automotive market, as automotive OEMs and
Tier 1 suppliers rarely pay for any prototype development.  In successfully developing a
prototype, Hyperion developed a process to disperse their interim product of billions of
intertwined MW carbon nanotubes into individual nanotubes throughout a polymeric resin.
In order to have their composite fuel line specified in the development stages of an
automotive model, Hyperion also needed to scale up their process to make tonnes of the
product.  Hyperion filed several patents over three years of development, and achieved their
first product sales in 1992.
After this first successful product development, Hyperion moved to a larger facilities to
have room for commercial scale production equipment and further growth.   Hyperion then
concentrated on developing prototypes and specifying their product into other automotive
applications.  In the mid 90s, Hyperion partnered with GE Plastics to develop further
automotive product applications.  First they developed conductive polymer composite
automotive mirror casings for Ford and other automotive OEMs which could be
21
electrostatically painted (along with the rest of the metallic portions of the car).  Next they
jointly developed conductive polymer composite fenders, which met or surpassed metallic
alternatives, giving advantages of weight-savings and styling options.  Most of their materials
sales for polymer composite fenders have been for European car models, as weight savings
have been more highly valued in the European market.
During this time, Hyperion also continued to scale up their process and developed a
high tonnage nanotube reactor.  In 1998, an MIT graduate with technology product
development experience was hired on as Director of Business Development, and he had a
large influence on Hyperion’s subsequent product expansion and commercialization strategy.
Some of his initiatives included expanding their sales presence globally and moving slightly
further down the value chain, by compounding resins in-house in order to have control over
the dispersion of their MW carbon nanotube product.  Hyperion’s growth was rapid, but
could have been even more so with additional external financing.  And, although their
product development efforts were largely successful, they did not meet with universal
success.  For example, Hyperion’s R&D team had been working on developing their product
for structural composite aerospace parts. This involved dispersing their nanotube product into
the thermoset resins most suitable for aerospace structural parts.  Their efforts at
demonstrating enhanced value in these applications have been largely unsuccessful to date.   
Hyperion’s first successful product development outside of the automotive market was
in consumer electronics.  In this instance, Hyperion was approached by a consumer
electronics OEM who valued their material’s attributes.  Hyperion found consumer
electronics OEMS to be far more open to collaboration on product development than
automotive OEMs.  In fact, Hyperion was able to create strategic alliances with consumer
electronic OEMS and co-developed several components which took advantage of their static
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dissipation properties and the integrity and cleanliness of their composite materials.   These
products, including internal disc drive components, handling trays and devices for
manufacturing disk drive components, and test sockets for integrated circuits, have become a
major product revenue stream for Hyperion.
In the late 90s and into the early 2000s, Hyperion’s R&D team also developed products
which used their material in advanced batteries for the power generation industry.  Hyperion
received competitive SBIR grants from the DoD from 1996 to 1999 to develop MW carbon
nanotube electrodes for electrochemical capacitors, and issued several patents from this work.
Concurrently, they were developing composites with non-polymeric matrix materials.  From
2000 to 2004, Hyperion developed their MW carbon nanotube product as a catalyst support,
which has power generation and emerging alternative automotive applications.  They also
filed a patent on the use of their product for the emerging application of field emission
displays. Hyperion has found IP protection to be critical to their ability to capture value, both
in negotiating with large strategic alliance partners and in discouraging new entrants.  Hence,
they have filed over 100 patents, and actively expand and extend their patent portfolio.
Currently, Hyperion’s product line consists predominantly of composites of their MW
carbon nanotube product, dispersed into thermoplastic resins. They are continuing to grow
their products and revenues into the automotive, electronics, power generation and
communication segments, and are looking to expand their sales into other market verticals, as
well as ‘staking out’ IP in emerging markets.  They are the oldest and, arguably, the most
successful dedicated nanomaterials venture in the world to date, achieving between $20 and
$50 million in annual revenues;7 yet, to achieve that success, Hyperion needed patient capital,
alliance partners, and an early focus on substitution rather than emerging markets.
3.3 Analysis of Exemplar Evidence and of Boston Sample
                                                 
7 revenue estimate obtained from ReferenceUSA
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The evidence from our case exemplar and our sample of advanced materials ventures
provide further validation of our model (Figure 2) and allow us to generate propositions for
future empirical testing. Hyperion Catalysis demonstrates the potential for substantial value
creation of an advanced materials venture.  To date they are still a relatively small firm, but
there is substantial utility for their product in automotive and consumer electronics static
dissipation applications, and they are developing applications in the aerospace and power
generation industries.  In the longer term, they could enable entirely new applications, such as
the new consumer electronics products enabled by field emission displays and economically
viable automotive fuel cells.  The other advanced materials firms in our sample are
developing generic upstream technology which could also enable substitutes for a broad
range of products in several existing markets and enable both new applications and entirely
new markets. To generalize, advanced materials innovations are generic technologies with
the potential for significant value creation.
However, our case exemplar demonstrates the challenges of matching radical
advanced materials technology to market applications.  Hyperion considered many markets
for their MW carbon nanotube technology in 1989, most notably structural thermoplastic
composites in the automotive industry, structural thermoset composites for aerospace, and
energy storage applications for the power generation industry.8  Hyperion had difficulty
prioritising these markets, largely because of the factors influencing technological and market
uncertainty, depicted in Figure 2.   They resolved much of this uncertainty over time with the
assistance of long-term financing and effective alliance partners.
The technological uncertainty facing Hyperion in 1989 stemmed from their radical
technology, the need for process innovations to scale up production and to reduce cost, and
the multiple markets they considered targeting, all with different attribute valuations.  The
                                                 
8 see, for example, the abstract of  US PAT No. 4,663,230
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radical nature of their technology is evidenced by the substantial new functionality provided
by their composite resins and by their extensive patent portfolio.  Pat Collins, the Director of
Marketing for Hyperion, believes that their strong IP and policy of “patenting everything and
patenting broadly” has been very important to their success.
Hyperion’s process innovations, from 1985-1997, included scaling up production of
nanotubes, dispersion of these nanotubes in various resins, and application specific
production process innovations.  Their need for process innovations was increased by the
existence of established substitute products.  As an example, in fuel lines, Hyperion needed to
match existing mechanical attributes and compete on component price with steel fuel lines.
In Hyperion’s case, their most promising market applications emerged when other
material suppliers approached them with an application idea.  However, in these different
markets, Hyperion’s customers have differing utility for the performance attributes that can
be achieved with Hyperion’s composite products, such as static dissipation, processability,
cleanliness, strength, stiffness, fire retardance, processability, and weightsavings.  As the
relative importance of performance attributes is understood for specific market applications,
process innovations can optimize production of the customized material.  Until these are
understood, technological uncertainty remains.
Hyperion’s market uncertainty stemmed from the difficulty of obtaining accurate
attribute utility information from a position upstream in a single industry value chain, the
need for complementary innovations, the lack of continuity, observability and trialability, and
the temptation/need to focus on more than one industry with differing customer utility for
product attributes.   When commercializing an innovation from an upstream position in
targeted industry value chains, it is difficult to establish the consumer needs which will
convince OEM customers to switch to a new product or component.   The left hand side of
Figure 4 depicts the layers of the automotive value chain with which Hyperion needed to
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work in order to commercialize their materials innovation in a single industry.  This
information gathering and communication challenge is exacerbated when the consumer is not
aware of their own preferences for the intermediate product attributes.
Figure 4 also demonstrates the breadth of the challenge facing advanced materials
ventures, as complementary innovations are required in different levels of several industry
value chains before the innovating firm can realize the value of their innovation.  In the
automotive industry, for example, Hyperion’s alliance partner needed to match a suitable
resin to Hyperion’s nanotubes to enable good composite properties, adequate dispersion, and
good secondary processability.  Next, Hyperion’s tier one automotive customer needed to
develop design and process changes to take advantage of composite material strengths. In the
automotive fuel line, this involved altering the powertrain design, with new fasteners and
assembly methods, and had the benefit of eliminating the multiple forming steps required to
make steel fuel line.  Hyperion’s other automotive and consumer electronics applications also
required design changes, but Hyperion reduced the need for more uncertain complementary
innovations by focusing on “mundane” applications which were substituting for existing
components.    Conversely, for the emerging markets of automotive fuel cells and field
emission displays, Hyperion is waiting on many complementary innovations and, in the case
of fuel cells, regulatory changes, to enable them to demonstrate value in specific applications.
The remainder of our sample of advanced materials ventures also demonstrates the need for
complementary innovations, as six of the ten firms specified that they were waiting on
complementary innovations in order to commercialise one or more of their products.
The need for process innovations and component design changes by Hyperion’s
customers creates a lack of continuity for the customer.  This lack of continuity slowed down
the adoption of Hyperion’s products and continues to slow down the broadening of their
product line into further applications.  Additionally, lack of observability and trialability of
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Hyperion’s  MW carbon nanotube materials by first customers and then consumers acted to
slow down the adoption of Hyperion’s products.  Until Hyperion was able to create a
prototype fuel line, they weren’t able to demonstrate the value of their innovation to their
automotive OEM customers.  The automotive consumers do not observe Hyperion’s
innovation in the fuel line application whatsoever and may not observe Hyperion’s
innovation in their exterior structural automotive parts either.  Automotive consumers cannot
trial the product until it is already specified in a new automotive model.  Thus, a lack of
continuity, observability, and trailability added to market uncertainty for Hyperion and
slowed the adoption of their products.
The applicability of Hyperion’s technology to multiple applications across several
industries also added to market uncertainty.   Hyperion needed to divide their R&D and
business development focus between two streams of automotive industry applications, the
aerospace industry, the consumer electronics industry, and the power generation industry.
Exploration of each of these industries required the development of relationships with
different customers and engaging in unique process R&D and additional complementary
innovations.  The need for industry specific regulatory changes and education of designers
also contributed to the market uncertainty involved with a focus on multiple markets.
Hyperion would have been unable to demonstrate value in specific applications without
financing and access to complementary assets.  This process of matching technology
competencies to market opportunities requires sufficient financing to undertake the initial
technological development, subsequent process innovations, experimentation with prototype
development for difference market applications, alliance partner formation with holders of
complementary assets and with potential customers.  Commercialization of an advanced
materials technology to create and capture value will further require obtaining additional
external financing.  In particular, a manufacturing model requires significant external
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financing.
Hyperion is unusual as a nanomaterials firm in that they have already achieved
substantial product revenues: this success may be attributed in part to their early formation
and their conservative focus on substitution applications.   However, it still took 11 years
from the founding of the firm to achieve any product revenues.  Hyperion was fortunate to
have ‘patient capital’ from their founder.  However, financing remained a constraint for them,
as they indicated that they could have grown more quickly in the 1990s with additional
financing.  Pat Collins, marketing manager of Hyperion, believes that Hyperion's success has
largely been due to applying new technology to “mundane applications” and thus “shortening
their time to market.” Thus, instead of waiting 15-20 years to get to market, it took Hyperion
only 7 years (1982-1989) to solve their own technological problems and to be ready for
commercial applications.
The rest of our sample of advanced materials ventures also face financial constraints
in their attempts to demonstrate value in specific applications and, ultimately, to create and
capture value.  AM5 and AM7 in Table 3 demonstrate this anticipated slow rate of revenue
growth.  AM4, AM8, and AM9 also demonstrate this slow growth rate, as they all were
incubated for over a decade within larger firms.  These long timeframes, high technological
and market uncertainty, the need to demonstrate value in specific downstream applications,
and the time necessary to develop and maintain effective strategic alliances, all make
intensive demands on these small (average size of 26 employees) advanced materials
ventures.
 In addition to the need for financing, the creation of effective alliance partnerships is
essential to creating and capturing value for an advanced materials venture.  Hyperion
partnered with a resin supplier for their automotive fuel line application.  This partnership
provided Hyperion with access to technological assets for compounding, co-extrusion and
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injection molding, full scale production facilities and fuel line prototype development, and
with marketing relationships with an automotive Tier 1 supplier and OEM.  In the consumer
electronics industry, Hyperion partnered with several consumer electronic OEMS, which
helped them access more varied markets. Pat Collins of Hyperion believes that “a small
advanced materials firm needs to partner with a larger/established player somewhere along
the value chain in each industry vertical they pursue.”  He also believes that, although large
firms “have all the resources in the world, they are often too focussed on their own
customers’ current needs to perceive emerging technologies and products.”
Thus, the attempt to realise and capture the value potential from radical advanced
materials technology requires a large investment of capital over a long period of time, and the
resolution of high levels of technological and market uncertainty.  A strategy of
experimentation is required, which may involve R&D and business development across
several industries.  Access to financing and the establishment of effective alliance partners
are required in order to demonstrate value in specific market applications, a necessary
intermediate step for an advanced materials venture to create and capture value.
4.   Creating and Capturing Value from Advanced Materials Innovations
Although there are opportunities to create substantial value from advanced materials
innovations, there are also considerable disincentives facing both established firms and new
entrants.  For publicly-held companies, short-term shareholder pressures are in conflict with
the required high capital costs, long lead times, and uncertainty surrounding complementary
innovations.  Additionally, established firms have many other reasons to avoid the adoption
of new technology (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Leonard, 1996; Utterback, 1996;
Christensen, 1997).  For new ventures, their upstream position in the value chains of their
target markets and the cost, time, and uncertainty of market experimentation make successful
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commercialization of generic radical technology extremely challenging.  When they can
access patient capital and mobilize complementary assets, they may be able to create and
capture maximum value through a manufacturing strategy.  Alternatively, where new entrants
can create and protect radical advanced materials technology, they may be able to create and
capture value through a licensing strategy.  As 80% of the firms in our sample are currently
employing an in-house manufacturing business model, they clearly believe it is the best route
to creating and capturing value.  However, as discussed in sections 2 and 3, an in-house
manufacturing model also exposes an advanced materials venture to prolonged technical and
marketing uncertainty and the need for external financing.  We propose that, over time, the
population of advanced materials ventures which follow in-house manufacturing models will
have the largest variance in their success metrics – either creating and capturing substantial
value or failing outright.  Thus,
P1: AM ventures which employ in-house manufacturing models have a bimodal success
profile,  experiencing either high growth or failure
The prolonged, high level of uncertainty and the commercialization costs faced by advanced
materials ventures can be reduced by access to complementary assets through alliance
partners (Niosi, 1993), who themselves are taking advantage of the specialized R&D
capabilities of the venture.  These resource and risk-sharing features of alliances between
new technology ventures and industry incumbents have been well established in other
emerging technology sectors (Tyebjee and Hardin, 2004; King et al, 2003; Niosi, 2003).
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) found that those semiconductor firms with more
innovative strategies and targeting emerging markets had higher rates of alliance formation,
suggesting that both the venture and alliance partner have growth and risk-sharing
motivations.  The benefits of alliance formation for advanced materials ventures include
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access to complementary technologies, access to manufacturing, regulatory, legal,
reputational, marketing, and distribution resources, financial investment, and risk-sharing
(Niosi, 1993).  An alliance partner must provide access to one or more of these resources in
order to reduce the barriers to entry to a particular industry for an advanced materials venture.
Such ‘effective’ alliances are expected to increase the likelihood of success for an advanced
materials venture.  Thus,
P2 AM ventures which build ‘effective’ alliances will be more likely to survive and achieve
high growth
As well as demonstrating the impact of effective alliance partners, our case study exemplar
demonstrates the technical and market uncertainty reduction and the shortened adoption
timeframe of targeting ‘substitution’ applications in existing product markets.  These
substitution applications still required process innovations and design changes, but required
far less complementary innovations and were less dependent on the regulatory environment
or infrastructure changes than emerging market applications. However, most advanced
materials ventures require external financing and thus need to attract venture capital: hence,
intellectual property in an emerging market is required.  As financing is critical to an
advanced materials venture’s ability to create and capture value, we propose that a blended
strategy with an early focus on substitution applications will increase a ventures likelihood of
success.  Thus,
P3 Firms which focus their resources on substitution markets but create credible IP for
emerging markets will be more likely to survive and achieve high growth
Value creation by advanced materials ventures is also dependent on location.  It is well
documented that some countries provide better environments than others for the formation
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and growth of firms in specific industries (Nelson, 1993; Porter, 1990). More recent studies
have also shown the local environment to be an important determinant of success in many
high technology sectors (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003; Porter and Stern, 2001).   We propose
that, for ventures in the advanced materials sector, both national and regional systems of
innovation are determinants of the creation and capture of value, because they impact the
effectiveness of ventures’ matching process, predominantly through the availability of
substantial commercialization grants and through the potential for alliance creation.  Thus,
P4 Countries and regions which have innovation systems supporting the market
experimentation process will have advanced materials ventures with higher survival and
growth rates
 5.  Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated the challenges inherent in commercializing a
radical, generic technology from an upstream position in a variety of industry value chains.
We have developed a model which demonstrates the influence of the radical, generic, and
upstream nature of advanced materials innovation on the ability of a venture to create value.
We applied this theoretical model to a case exemplar and a sample of 10 advanced materials
ventures and found it helpful in explaining value creation in terms of the existing pieces of
literature and evidence.  From the relevant literature, our model, our observations, and case
study analysis, we offer 4 testable propositions for future empirical studies.
We explain the causes and influences of technological and market uncertainty in the
commercialization of advanced materials technology and suggest a method to manage these
uncertainties.  Advanced materials ventures can manage uncertainties through balancing
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resource allocation between the pursuit of large opportunities and the pursuit of near-term
revenue generation. Technology and market strategies which prioritize substitution markets
without the need for substantial complementary innovations are most likely to generate near
term revenue.  However, in the longer term, such innovations are generally too specific and
too low margin to be of interest to venture capitalists.  It is generic radical advanced materials
technology with many applications in major markets and the potential to enable entirely new
markets9 and capture future returns on a substantial scale that can attract venture capital and
large corporate investment.  Thus, advanced materials ventures are most likely to achieve
success if they develop an IP claim on a long-term, emerging market application with major
potential while focusing most of their time and resources on substitution applications.
Prioritizing market applications in this way could be guided by viability analysis (Maine and
Ashby, 2002) and by assessing the complementary assets of interested potential alliance
partners.
National science policy and granting programs influence the ability of advanced
materials ventures to create and capture value.  Specifically, the technology-market matching
process of an advanced materials venture and their subsequent market experimentation are
greatly assisted by early stage financing from government grants.  Interviews with our sample
of advanced materials ventures revealed that, for most, US federal SBIR funding was critical
to achieving their strategic aims.  Sufficient near-market R&D support has not been available
elsewhere, for example in the UK (Garnsey and Moore 1993) and in Canada (Conference
Board of Canada, 2004).  Market-oriented government granting programs are particularly
important to advanced materials ventures, given the scarcity of VC funds available to firms
commercialising advanced materials.  Such national policy solutions can create the most
                                                 
9 Examples of efforts in this categorization would include carbon nanotubes for next
generation microprocessors and memory storage, PEM fuel cells for automotive applications,
and LEPs for flexible TVs and signage.
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value by supporting the exploratory processes of advanced materials ventures, for instance,
by subsidising marketing information for the entire sector, providing product regulatory
testing at government laboratories and providing incentives for partnerships between large
and small companies developing product prototypes for specific market applications.
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Table 1: Literature Review of Technological Innovation Types
Innovation Type Emphasis Authors
Generic Technology /
General Purpose Technology
Breadth of impact across
industries
Hagedoorn & Schakenraad,
1991; Martin, 1993; Keenan,
2003; Bresnahan & Trajtenberg,
1995; Rosenberg & Trajtenberg,
2001; Shane, 2004
Radical Technology /
Radical Innovation
Depth of impact on
industries
Substantial
cost/performance
improvements
 Foster, 1986; Utterback, 1996
Revolutionary  Innovation /
Competence Altering
Innovation
Requires change in firm
capabilities
Abernathy & Clark, 1985;
Utterback, 1996; Tushman &
Anderson; 1986
Discontinuous Innovation /
Disruptive Technology
New competencies enable
new entrants to take
market share from
incumbent firms
Utterback, 1996; Christensen,
1997
Product Innovation vs.
Process Innovation
Emergence of a dominant
design
Abernathy & Utterback, 1978;
Utterback, 1996;
Upstream Innovation vs.
Downstream Innovation
Position of introduction in
value chain
Porter, 1985 Pavitt, 1984;
Klevorick et al 1994; Arora et
al, 2001
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Figure 1: The Matching Process Required for the
Commercialization
        of Advanced Materials Technology
Market Challenge
Matching 
Process
Cut to 
Create 
Value 
Tech Challenge
Ma
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Un
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Technology  
Uncertainty
$$$, time
$$$
, tim
e
complementary assets
market experimentation
IP, Custom design & 
development, pilot scale-up
multiple market applications, 
diverse regulations, 
incumbent’s defensive 
response
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Table 2: Technology and Market Factors Impacting Value Creation and Capture
               in the Commercialization of Radical, Generic Technology
+    = positive impact on value creation and/or capture
-  = negative impact on value creation and/or capture
Radical, Generic
Technology
Upstream Input into Value Chain Presence of Market
Incumbents
Technology
Value created by new
cost/functional frontier
(+++)
Complementary innovations and
downstream process innovations
required (-)
Process developments
required for production
economies of scale (-)
Technology
and
Market
Matching
Iterative market
prioritization and
subsequent refinement
of attributes for specific
applications through
customised R&D  (-)
Uncertainty about consumer
utility for attributes and
achievable production
economics requires pilot plant
investment and development
before market viability is
confirmed (--)
Potential for alliances
with vertically integrated
firms and/or OEMs with
complementary assets (+)
Market
Broad potential market
applications
(++)
Widely varying
attribute utility between
these markets (--)
Upstream input into value chain
requires either vertical
integration in each market or
alliance creation in each market
to mobilize complementary
assets (-)
Downstream barriers to adoption
(product, organizational,
designer, regulatory)  (--)
Incumbents unwilling to
cannibalize existing
products (-)
Price competition (-)
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Figure 4: Hyperion Catalysis’s Upstream Positions in the Value
Chains of their Existing and Target Markets
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